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Abstract 
This paper investigated how, in the course of achieving the IMF-supported programme quantitative 
conditionality, monetary aggregates, in particular, might cause volatility in macroeconomic variables in 
Tanzania. Specifically, the paper ascertained the extent to which achieving the IMF-supported programme 
quarterly targets amplified macroeconomic volatility. The results from an Error Correction Model indicated that 
although the IMF aims at helping member countries to stabilize their economies, paradoxically, findings 
revealed that in the course of fulfilling the IMF-supported programme conditionality, the process amplified 
macroeconomic volatility in Tanzania. Also the behavior of fiscal aggregates, such as government expenditure 
and deficit were noted to contribute to macroeconomic volatility in Tanzania. The paper suggests that the IMF 
needs to design appropriate performance criteria, which are manageable by a recipient country within a specified 
period. Also recipient countries need to implement their economic policies on a steady basis in order to be able 
to fulfill the agreed IMF-supported programme conditionality feasibly. It may be desirable for the Bank of 
Tanzania to move from a fixed to a flexible monetary targeting framework, which takes allowance of shocks in 
real and financial sectors, in order to reduce volatility in the economy. A flexible monetary policy framework 
would take into account base money changes as well as developments in other macroeconomic indicators.  
Keywords: Central Bank Responses; Macroeconomic Volatility; and IMF Conditionality. 
The views expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of 
Tanzania or Bank of Tanzania policy.  
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigated how responses of the Bank of Tanzania to International Monetary Fund (IMF) -
supported programme conditionality2 represented by the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets impact on 
macroeconomic volatility3. If the quarterly targets, monetary aggregates in particular, are not achieved, the IMF 
may withdraw the programme (technical and financial support) from the recipient country. Although the IMF 
aims at assisting member countries to stabilize their economies, the use of monetary tools such as open market 
operations by Central Banks in order to meet the IMF-supported programme targets such as reserve money 
(M0); such actions may lead to interest rate and inflation volatilities. Similarly, selling and buying foreign 
currency to meet Net International Reserves (NIR) as one of the IMF-supported programme targets may translate 
to exchange rate volatility.  
Many studies such as those by Mussa et al. (1999), DFID (2003), and IMF (2004c) focused on the role of IMF 
funds and stabilization of macroeconomic variables in the economy. The implication being that the IMF-
supported programme conditionality reduces macroeconomic volatility. The authors claim that the IMF 
resources associated with conditionality have helped to reduce macroeconomic volatility in both developed and 
developing countries. The negative impact of IMF-supported programme conditionality on macroeconomic 
volatility has not been much researched. However, most counter arguments relate to political and social negative 
impacts of IMF-supported programme conditionality on recipient countries. For example, Wood and Lockwood 
(1999) as well as Goldstein (2000) pointed out that conditions are too intrusive and destructive of national 
ownership. Also Meltzer Report (2000), Easterly (2001) and Stiglitz (2002) have often criticized the IMF for 
applying one-size-fits-all economic policy prescriptions without being sensitive to the context and ignoring 
borrowers’ domestic political constraints. This paper investigated how in the process of achieving IMF-support 
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2
 Conditionality refers to covenants on formulation of policies that countries agree to honour when they 
participate in IMF-supported programmes. That is, IMF conditionality refers to policies a member country is 
expected to follow or meet in order to secure access to the resources of the IMF. 
3
 Volatility refers to the frequency and severity fluctuations. It is a tendency of rapid and extreme fluctuations of 
a variable. In finance, the term is used to describe the size and frequency of the fluctuations in the price of a 
particular stock, bond or commodity. 
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programme quarterly targets, which represent the IMF conditionality, may result in macroeconomic volatility in 
Tanzania. 
Volatility in macroeconomic variables is mostly perceived to have negative consequences on the economy. 
Welfare costs of macroeconomic volatility in developing countries are particularly large. They come, first, from 
the direct welfare loss of deviating from a smooth path of consumption, optimal for most people, who are 
naturally risk averse. No less important, macroeconomic volatility has a negative impact on output growth and 
thus on future consumption. Volatility has this negative effect through its links with various forms of uncertainty 
(economic, political, and policy-related) and with the tightening of binding investment constraints [(when 
volatility reflects large negative fluctuations) Aizenman and Pinto, 2005, Wolf, 2005]. 
Tanzania is among developing countries receiving both financial and non-financial assistance normally with 
conditionality from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The IMF attaches two different 
types of conditionality to its loans and other related donor assistance for poor countries, quantitative and 
structural conditionality. Quantitative conditionality refers to macroeconomic targets determining, for example, 
the level of the fiscal deficit a government is allowed to run, net domestic assets, reserve money and 
accumulation of international reserves. Structural conditionality on the other hand pushes for institutional and 
legislative policy reforms within the country. Reforms include, for example, trade reforms, price liberalization as 
well as privatization. 
In IMF-supported programmes, conditionality has traditionally focused predominantly on quantitative targets for 
macroeconomic variables deemed crucial for the restoration of a country’s external viability. Most programmes 
include targets for the fiscal deficit, and/or public debt, expansion of domestic credit, reserve money and 
accumulation of international reserves. Since 1986, Tanzania has been implementing different reform 
programmes with IMF and World Bank. Therefore, the Bank of Tanzania and Ministry of Finance have to 
implement both monetary and fiscal policies to achieve the quantitative targets agreed in the IMF-supported 
programme so that the country can continue receiving IMF resources and technical support.  
In line with the government’s initiatives to alleviate poverty and strengthen the economy, the Bank of Tanzania 
(BoT) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) have been implementing monetary and fiscal policies, respectively, 
with some macroeconomic indicators of the IMF-supported programme targets being monitored on a quarterly 
basis. Tanzania has had such targets since July 1996. Reserve money (M0) and net international reserves (NIR) 
are some of the used variables.  
It is in the process of achieving IMF programme targets, volatility of macroeconomic variables including 
exchange and interest rates as well as the rate of inflation may result. The BoT has been implementing a tight 
monetary policy to reach its monetary targets or performance criteria (indicators). In the process of achieving the 
targets, statistics indicate that during the months between quarter ends, some of the variables such as reserve 
money, frequently record values that are well above the target. In contrast, they are closer to or even equal to the 
target at the end of each quarter. At the same time, actual net international reserves have been fluctuating below 
and above the targets. Fluctuations in reserve money affect both the interest rate and rate of inflation. In addition, 
fluctuations in net international reserves affect the exchange rate.  
The NIR and M0 have been fluctuating with a sharp decline, particularly at the end of the quarter when targets 
are needed to be met. These are suspected to cause volatility in exchange and interest rates as well as the rate of 
inflation (see Figures 1.1, 1.2 below and Figures I and II in Appendix). 
 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show a sudden shift towards meeting IMF-supported programme targets for both reserve 
money and international reserves, particularly at the end of each quarter. Figure 1.1 shows that actual reserve 
money declined from Tanzanian shillings (TZS) 920 billion in August 2004 to meet the IMF-supported 
programme target of about TZS 875 billion in September 2004. Also, reserve money declined from TZS 1,030 
billion in February 2005 to meet the target of TZS 984 billion in March 2005. At the same time Figure 1.2 shows 
that net international reserves declined from United States of America Dollar (USD) 1,835 million in November 
2005 to meet the target of USD 1,721 million in December 2005. Also net international reserves declined from 
USD 2,017 million in May 2006 to meet the target of USD 1,656 million in June 2006. These Figures indicate 
that neither reserve money nor net international reserves had a smooth path throughout the periods. The same 
movement between targets and actual was recorded in period between 2007 and 2009 (figures I and II in 
Appendix). 
Such movement of actual reserve money and net international reserves to meet their respective targets provides 
some evidence on how the quantitative conditionality might cause volatility in macroeconomic variables, leading 
to macroeconomic misalignments, which consequently, constrain both economic growth and welfare 
improvement. Therefore, although the IMF aims at helping member countries to stabilize their economies and 
reduce macroeconomic fluctuations, such up-down movements of reserve money and net international reserve 
targets may result in macroeconomic volatility. There is a gap in information as to whether or not the IMF-
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supported programme conditionality, represented by programme quarterly targets, causes macroeconomic 
volatility in the economy. Therefore, it is against this background that this paper investigated the manner in 
which the implementation of IMF conditionality may impact negatively rather than positively in the country’s 
economy. 
 
Figure 1.1: Quantitative Performance Criteria and Benchmarks, Actual Against Target Reserve Money 
 
Source: Bank of Tanzania- Daily Reserve Money Statistics Report (2005, 2007) 
 
Figure 1.2: Quantitative Performance Criteria and Benchmarks, Actual Against Target Net International 
Reserves 
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Source: Bank of Tanzania- Daily Reserve Money Statistics Report (2005, 2009) 
 
Against this backdrop, this paper pursues two objectives. 
• To ascertain the extent to which achieving the reserve money target explains the volatility of 
macroeconomic variables (interest rate, exchange rate and rate of inflation). 
• To ascertain the extent to which achieving the net international reserves target explains the volatility of the 
same macroeconomic variables. 
Both the BoT and MoF have agreed to implement monetary and fiscal reforms to meet IMF-supported 
programme goals. In this setting, it is useful to shed light  on the question as to whether or not tightening of 
monetary policy, particularly at the end of each quarter, resulting from meeting the IMF-supported programme 
conditions, causes volatility in macroeconomic variables, which may be costly to society and lead to slower 
economic growth. The paper may be used by policymakers as a guide and basis for negotiations with the IMF, 
especially on the impact and cost of conditions of programme to be supported. 
What follows are section II, which reviews the theoretical and empirical literature and section III which 
addresses the issues of methodology and modelling. Section IV deals with empirical estimation of the extent to 
which IMF conditionality causes macroeconomic volatility in Tanzania. Section V provides a conclusion and 
policy implications.  
Reserve Money Developments: Monthly Actuals and 
PRGF Targets for 2004/2005 
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2. Literature Review 
According to the IMF, loan repayment would be at risk without conditions; to secure the revolving character of 
the Fund’s resources conditionality is thus inevitable (IMF 2001a). According to the IMF, these policies are 
intended to help and ensure that the member country will overcome its external payments problem and thus be in 
a position to repay the Fund in a timely manner. Therefore, the reason for conditionality is to restore a viable 
external position in order to ensure the “revolving character” of the IMF resources, i.e., that the resources made 
available to a member by the Fund will be repaid over a stipulated period of time. The IMF conditionality might 
serve as a commitment device to address time inconsistency problems. The objective of conditions is to provide 
credibility (Bird, 1984; Collier et al. 1997; and Dreher and Vaubel, 2004a). Conditionality may represent a 
mechanism that forces recipient governments to commit to reforms, which might therefore enable an efficient 
release from the trap if, and only if, conditionality can be enforced (Fafchamps, 1996). According to Mayer and 
Alex (2008), financial assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) aims to help member countries to reduce their economic policy distortions. 
However, the IMF has often been criticized for applying one-size-fits-all economic policy prescriptions without 
sensitivity to the context and ignoring borrowers’ domestic political constraints (Meltzer Report, 2000; Easterly 
2001; and Stiglitz 2002). A number of political leaders from developing countries have expressed concern about 
IMF policies. Thus, in a speech, the first President of Tanzania, J. K. Nyerere in the early 1980s asked "when did 
the IMF become an international Ministry of Finance? When did nations agree to surrender to it their power of 
decision making?"4 At roughly the same time the Prime Minister, Manley, of Jamaica predicted that "the IMF 
will be a source of complete economic disaster in the third world unless it has a look at itself5. According to (B. 
J, 1980), “the question which is bothering many economists and political leaders is whether a sufficiently large 
number of developing countries will be in a position to accept high conditionality and borrow from the Fund, and 
if they do borrow whether the inevitable consequence of recourse to the IMF would not be widespread political 
and economic instability in developing countries”. 
Tanzania is one of the developing countries which have accepted the IMF conditionality, and it has been 
implementing the IMF-supported programme’s quarterly targets since July 1996. Reserve money, partly, money 
supply and net international reserves are some of the variables used as the IMF-supported programme targets to 
be met by Tanzania. According to the quantity theory of money, any increase in the money supply will result in 
an increase in the price level, which, if sustained, would be inflationary. Also in the absence of the liquidity trap, 
Keynesian theory emphasized the negative relationship between money supply and interest rates. According to 
the money market model of Case and Fair (1999), an increase in the money supply in the short-run causes a 
decrease in interest rates, because more money is supplied than is needed. In other words, when the central bank 
tightens monetary policy, it slows the process of private banks issuing and selling securities on the open market 
and pulling money (that could be loaned) out of the private sector, which will lead to an increase in interest rates. 
Repeated selling of government securities at the end of each quarter to meet the IMF-supported programme 
targets, which is contractionary monetary policy, will result in fluctuations of both the rate of inflation and 
interest rates in the economy.   
In many countries, the central bank's unique responsibility is to achieve price stability. In this process, the target 
rate of inflation is fixed jointly by the central bank and the government. Although the central bank uses monetary 
tools to achieve the desired level of inflation, it has the further responsibility of enacting a tighter monetary 
policy that will enable the IMF-supported programme targets to be met at the end of each quarter. This calls for 
the extra selling of treasury bills and bonds, called liquidity paper, which will reduce the money supply and, in 
turn, raise interest rates in the economy.  
Another form of central bank intervention is more direct. More specifically, direct intervention can be defined as 
the purchase and sale of foreign exchange by monetary authorities. The purchase (sale) by monetary authorities 
leads to an increase (decrease) in the monetary base if the intervention is not sterilized. When the authorities 
simultaneously or with a very short time lag take the necessary steps to offset the effects of the change in official 
foreign exchange on the domestic monetary base, it is called sterilized intervention. Non-sterilized intervention 
affects the exchange rate as well as the monetary base.  
Fatum and Hutchison (1999) investigated whether daily intervention operations in the United States are related 
to changes in expectations over the stance of future monetary policy. They concluded that the interventions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank appear to have significantly increased the conditional variance of its funds futures rate, 
as the conditional variance was positively and significantly related to the magnitude of intervention operations. 
                                                          
4
 Speech by President Nyerere of Tanzani to Diplomats on January 1, 1980 at Dar es Salaam, reported in Third 
World News Forum, March 1980; cited from (B.J, 1980) paper. 
5
 Interview with Michael Leapman, The Times. London, May 2, 1980; cited from (B.J, 1980) paper. 
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Daroodian and Caporale (2001) used a daily measure of exchange-rate intervention in the yen-dollar exchange 
market for the period January 1985 to March 1997. While they found a statistically significant impact of 
intervention on spot rates, they showed that the official sales of dollars against either currency are associated 
with dollar depreciation, and the intervention led to increased uncertainty in the foreign exchange market. 
Unnikrishnan and Ravi Mohan (2003), using the ARCH procedure for the period January 1996 to March 2002, 
found that the Reserve Bank of India intervention affected the exchange rate level and volatility in the expected 
direction. Dominguez (1998) explored the effects of foreign exchange intervention on the behaviour of dollar-
mark and dollar-yen exchange rates. She found that secret interventions generally increase volatility. Her study 
indicates that intervention had effects on volatility that are situation specific and can be positive or negative.  
Previously, the Bank of Tanzania was involved in both selling and buying foreign currency (which is part of 
international reserves) as one way of controlling base money in the economy. However, currently, the BoT only 
sells foreign currency, and so is no longer involved in buying foreign currency in the economy. Despite the 
selling of foreign currency by the BoT for the purpose of price stability, it also sells extra foreign currency at the 
end of each quarter, when it is above the IMF-supported programme target, to fulfill the IMF conditionality. In 
so doing, it results in a fluctuation in international reserves which is directly linked to exchange rate fluctuations. 
Therefore, the fluctuations in both reserve money and international reserves will cause a fluctuation in exchange 
and interest rates and the rate of inflation. The intervention of the BoT through selling foreign currencies in the 
economy may increase volatility if it contributes to market uncertainty or encourages speculative attacks on the 
currency. However, the BoT partially sterilizes its intervention in the foreign exchange market, and so it is not 
clear whether it would be effective or not. This issue needs to be re-examined.  
Basing on the literature above, the following hypotheses were tested to verify whether the IMF conditionality 
caused macroeconomic volatility in Tanzania. 
 
(i) Achieving reserve money targets causes volatility in interest rates and the rate of inflation 
(ii) Achieving net international reserves targets causes volatility in the exchange rate 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Volatility Estimation 
Before estimating the impact of IMF-supported programme conditionality on macroeconomic volatility, 
estimation of GARCH model has to be performed in order to generate volatility series of exchange rate, interest 
rate, core rate of inflation, reserve money and net international reserves. GARCH models characterize the 
conditional distribution of t by imposing serial dependence on the conditional variance of innovations. In this 
model, the conditional variance is also a linear function of its own lags and has the form: 
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Equation (1) is the variance equation, which contains three components: a constant, last period volatility (the 
ARCH term) and last period variance (the GARCH term).  
A sufficient condition for the conditional variance to be positive with probability one is α0 > 0, αj  ≥ 0, j = 1,….q; 
βj ≥0, j = 1,…p. Necessary and sufficient conditions for positivity of the conditional variance in higher-order 
GARCH models are more complicated than the sufficient conditions given in Nelson and Cao (1992). 
3.2 Model Specification 
Modelling the impact of IMF –supported programme conditionality, quarterly targets in particular represented by 
reserve money (M0) and Net International Reserves (NIR) on macroeconomic variables was based on literature 
review. However, in order to capture both short-run and long-run relationship between variables in the model, 
cointegration and error correction term were adopted. Cointegration was used to capture long-run relationship 
while error correction term, which attempts to correct for deviations from the long-run equilibrium path or the 
disequilibrium transmitted in every period was adopted to capture short-run relationship.  
3.2.1 Exchange Rate equation 
According to Sarno and Taylor (2002), in economic field, there is no consensus in the literature about a preferred 
and generally accepted model of exchange rates. Thus, one has to select variables potentially affecting nominal 
exchange rate volatility as pointed out by Devereux and Lane (2003); Hviding, Nowak, and Ricci, (2004); and 
Hausmann, Panizza, and Rigobon (2006). In this paper, nominal exchange rate volatility (VEXCH) is 
hypothesized to be related to the following variables: volatility series of net international reserves (VNIR), 
Current Account balance (CAB), headline rate of inflation (HINFL) and error term (U1). Its associated error 
correction model can be specified as: 
DHINFDCABDVNIRDVEXCH 3210 αααα +++= - α4ect-1 + U1                          (2) 
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where D stands for the first difference and ect-1 is the error correction term. 
3.2.2 Interest Rate Equation 
Inflationary pressures affect interest rates because rates paid on most loans are fixed in the loan contract. A 
lender may be reluctant to lend money for any period of time if the purchasing power of that money will be less 
when it is repaid. Therefore, the lender will demand a higher rate known as an “inflationary premium.” Thus, 
high inflation pushes interest rates higher, while deflation causes rates to decline. Domestic sources affect the 
rate of interest through selling of treasury bills and treasury bonds (Sánchez, 2005). Volatility of interest rate 
(VINT) is modeled on the volatility of reserve money (VM0), government deficit (DF), headline rate of inflation 
(HINFL) and error term (U2). Its associated error correction model can be specified as: 
DVINT = β0 +β1DVM0 + β2DDEF +β3DHINFL – β4ect-1 + U2                     (3) 
3.2.3 Inflation Rate Equation 
According to Kandil and Hanan (2009), domestic determinants of inflation include: government expenditure, 
money supply, nominal effective exchange rate and a weighted average of price in major trading partners. The 
paper used the modified model of Magda and Hanan (2009), where volatility series of the core rate of inflation 
(VCINFL) is modeled on the volatility series of reserve money (VM0), government expenditure (GEXP) and 
error term (U3). Its associated error correction model can be specified as: 
DVCINFL = = µ0 + µ1DVM0 + µ2DGEXP– µ3ect-1 + U3                                                               (4) 
3.2.4 Regression Estimation with a Dummy Variable 
The entire data set (June 1980 to December 2009) was analysed by incorporating a dummy variable, which was 
used to control for the regime changes for the periods before (Jan 1980 to June 1996) and during (July 1996 to 
Dec 2009) the period of achieving the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets. The dummy variable took 
zero and one value for the periods before and during the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets, 
respectively. If the coefficient of the dummy variable is significant statistically, it indicates that achieving the 
IMF-supported programme quarterly targets has an impact on the volatility of macroeconomic variables. The 
dummy variable was included when modelling ECMs for exchange and interest rates as well as the core rate of 
inflation. 
3.3 Justification of Variables used 
Most variables that IMF uses as benchmark criteria include reserve money, net international reserves, net 
domestic financing, net foreign asset and the like. In this paper, reserve money and net international reserves, 
which are monetary aggregates, represent IMF-support programme conditionality. 
In order to make appropriate comparison between two sample periods, black market exchange rates proxy for 
market determined rates were used before exchange rate liberalization. At the same time, the first sample period 
horizon for interest rates started from January 1994 to June 1996 in order to avoid government controlled rates. 
This was due to absence of alternative interest rates, which were market determined before liberalization of the 
variable. In this paper, the IMF-supported programme quantitative conditionality was represented by IMF-
supported programme quarterly targets, basically, reserve money and net international reserve targets, which are 
monetary aggregates.  
The paper used two types of the rates of inflation, namely, headline rate of inflation (HINFL), which was used as 
an explanatory variable in modelling exchange and interest rates volatilities, as well as the core rate of inflation 
(CINFL)6  from which its volatility series generated was used as endogenous variable when modelling volatility 
of the rate of inflation. The idea of modelling volatility series of core inflation rate was to determine per se 
impact of monetary aggregate, reserve money in particular, on volatility in the rate of inflation. 
3.4 Data and Data Sources 
This paper used secondary monthly time series data. Time-series data on monthly reserve money (M0), net 
international reserves (NIR), current account balance (CAB), government expenditure (GEXP), government 
deficit (DF), both official and black market exchange rates (TZS to USD) (EXCH), interest rate (INT) and the 
core rate of inflation (CINFL) and headline rate of inflation (HINFL) from June 1980 to December 2009 were 
analysed.  
Two sample periods were analysed separately in this paper, the period before the introduction of the IMF-
supported programme quantitative conditionality from July 1980 to June 1996 (except interest rate), and the 
period during adoption of the IMF-supported programme quantitative conditionality covered from July 1996 to 
December 2009. The main sources of data were International Financial Statistics (IFS) Year book 2009 and 
Bank of Tanzania Economic and Operations Reports (various issues).  
                                                          
6
 This is the rate of inflation resulted from implemention of monetary policy. On the other hand, non-core rate of inflation is 
caused by food and energy. Therefore, headline inflation combine core and non-core rates of inflation. 
 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.16, 2013 
 
124 
3.5 Estimation Technique 
The equations were estimated using 198 observations before implementation and 162 observations when the 
BoT started implementing its tight monetary policy to achieve the IMF-supported programme targets. Two 
econometric packages, Eviews and Stata, were used for estimation, depending on the nature of equation to be 
estimated. Volatility equations are estimated using Eviews, while Stata is used to estimate OLS equations and 
the ADF tests.  
After this description of methodology, empirical results and their interpretation are presented in the next section. 
  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1Volatility Estimation 
Volatility series of all variables used were estimated using GARCH model specified in equation (1). All 
volatility estimation procedures were followed before and after estimation.  
To ensure that appropriate mean equations were specified, both Q and Q-squared tests were employed. To ensure 
that mean equations were appropriate specified. Also the ARCH test was carried out before and after volatility 
estimation to ensure that ARCH effect exists and does not exists respectively. 
4.2 Preliminary Data Examination 
Because the generated volatility series of all variables and other variables used in this paper are time series, then, 
before investigating the extent to which macroeconomic volatility was caused by achieving the IMF-supported 
programme quarterly targets of NIR and M0, examination of the data was carried out first. 
A3. Descriptive Statistics 
Preliminary diagnostic tests were conducted to check behaviour of the data used. Tables 1 and 2 in appendix 
present summary statistics of all variables used in the estimation in the first and second sample periods, 
respectively. Results give important information about the macroeconomic variables in Tanzania. The mean 
variance in the volatility series of core rate of inflation was much higher than that of volatility series of exchange 
and interest rates in the first sample period. On the other hand, the mean variance of the volatility series of 
interest rates was much higher than volatility series of exchange rate and the core rate of inflation in the second 
sample period. It implies that, on average, the core rate of inflation and interest rate fluctuate more than those of 
other macroeconomic variables in the first and second sample period, respectively. Also it was noted that the 
first sample period recorded a higher standard deviation in the rate of inflation volatility series than that of other 
macroeconomic variables. Also volatility series of interest rates were subjected to higher standard deviation in 
the second sample period than those of the other macroeconomic variable volatility series. The implication that 
can be drawn from this is that the degree of deviation of the core rate of inflation volatility in the first sample 
period and interest rate volatility of the second sample period from the mean value is far more than that of the 
other macroeconomic variables.  
A4. Unit root test and result 
It has often been argued that macroeconomic data are characterized by a stochastic trend and, if unresolved, the 
statistical behaviour of the estimators will be influenced by such a trend such that results may be spurious.  
Therefore, to resolve such problem a unit root test was conducted for the first and second sample period and 
results from the ADF tests for variables at both levels as well after the first difference are summarized in Table 
4.1. Results suggest that none of variables in the model is stationary and that variables in the model are 
integrated of order one ﴾i.e. I(1)﴿. However, after taking the first difference, all variables are stationary and the 
variables are integrated of order zero ﴾i.e. I(0)﴿.  
 
4.5 Regression results 
4.5.1 Cointegration Results 
After a unit root test for an individual variable then, test for existence of the long-run equilibrium relationships 
among variables was performed, where Johansen (1991) cointegration technique was used. After truncating lags 
that vary from 1 to 12, the Schwarz (SIC) and Akaike (AIC) criteria results suggested 4lags as appropriate in the 
cointegration analysis since the AIC has the lowest value.  
Tables 3-5 in the appendix present the Johansen Cointegration Test results for all systems of equations for two 
sample periods, each with one cointegrating relation in which the coefficients of the variables are significant at 
the 5 percent level and have the correct signs. The test statistics indicate quite clearly that cointegration is a 
relevant phenomenon. Therefore, a stable long-run relationship between volatility series of macroeconomic 
variables, net international reserves, reserve money and other moderating variables used seems to exist. In other 
words, variables follow a common trend. 
4.5.2 Impact of NIR volatility series (VNIR) on exchange rate volatility series (VEXCH) 
The OLS method was applied to regress VEXCH on VNIR, CAB, HINFL and error correction term. The 
econometric results for D(VEXCH) by OLS of the preferred model are presented in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.1: ADF Unit Root Tests 
 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: *1 percent level, **5 and ***10 percent level of significance. 
Table 4.2: Regression Results of the Preferred Model for D(VEXCH) by OLS    
 
Note: *and ** indicate significant at 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively, and VEXCH is the exchange 
rate volatility series and VNIR is the net international reserve volatility series. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
For the first sub-period, July 1980 to June 1996, results indicated that volatility in the exchange rate was not 
influenced by volatility in NIR. Therefore, NIR fluctuations have no impact on exchange rate volatility.  
However, the coefficient of error correction term was correctly signed and statistically significant at 1 percent 
level. The coefficient of the lagged error correction term for exchange rate is -0.2041. It means that if volatility 
series for exchange rate exceeds its long run equilibrium by 1 percentage point, for example, because of a 
temporary NIR shock, 20.41 percent of this deviation was adjusted in the first period. Therefore, this speed of 
adjustment was relatively low. 
In the second sub-period, July 1996 to Dec 2009, the relationship between volatility in the exchange rate and 
NIR was shown to be positive as hypothesized, and the coefficient of the NIR was statistically significant at 1 
percent level. Also current account balance contributed positively to the volatility in exchange rate and its 
coefficient was significant at 5 percent level. Results indicate that volatility in the exchange rate is influenced by 
volatility in NIR. Also R2 confirms that about 80 percent variation in exchange rate volatility is explained by 
volatility in NIR and current account balance. Thus, the assumption that volatility in the exchange rate is caused 
by IMF-supported programme conditionality through the intervention by BoT to achieve the IMF-supported 
Variable
Nature of 
selected ADF 
Equations
ADF test 
statistic
Order of 
integration
ADF test 
statistic
Order of 
integrati
on
Nature of 
selected ADF 
Equations
ADF test 
statistic
Order of 
integration
ADF test 
statistic
Order of 
integration
VEXCH 2lags -2.0994* I(1) -5.6776* I(0) 2lags -2.9590** I(1) -5.9506* I(0)
VINT 4lags -2.9849* I(1) -3.3061* I(0) 4lags -3.4561** I(1) -6.1083* I(0)
VCINFL 4lags -4.1559* I(1) -8.1272* I(0) 1lags -3.1927** I(1) -9.2781* I(0)
VNIR 4lags -3.9051* I(1) -6.1609* I(0) 2lags -2.6343* I(1) -6.7692* I(0)
VM0 2lags -2.1882** I(1) -8.7056* I(0) 2lags -3.4718** I(1) -6.2566* I(0)
HINFL 4lags -3.1694* I(1) -8.333* I(0) 2lags -1.7185*** I(1) -7.9530* I(0)
GEXP 4lags -2.8601* I(1) -10.1041* I(0) 4lags -3.9734** I(1) -13.4796* I(0)
DF 4lags -2.7076** I(1) -8.1496* I(0) 2lags -6.5950* I(1) -13.5765* I(0)
CAB 4lags -3.5347* I(1) -8.5833* I(0) 2lags -3.9070** I(1) -11.3350* I(0)
At levels At first difference
Second sample periodFirst sample period
At levels At first difference
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.0058 0.0017 -3.4452* 0.0007 -0.1296 0.1521 -0.8522 0.1134
D(VNIR) 0.0026 0.0031 0.8271 0.4092 1.0225 0.1220 8.3841* 0.0000
D(CAB) 0.0238 0.0195 1.2209 0.2237 0.1096 0.0312 3.5112** 0.0121
ect-1 -0.2041 0.0598 -3.4132* 0.0009 -0.1143 0.0120 -9.5213* 0.0000
R-squared 0.1175 R-squared 0.7991
Adjusted R-squared 0.0924 Adjusted R-squared 0.7704
Durbin-Watson stat 2.5222 Durbin-Watson stat 1.9257
Akaike info criterion 4.6782 Akaike info criterion 2.1234
Schwarz criterion 4.6272 Schwarz criterion 2.0752
Second Sample Period: July 1996 - Dec 2009First Sample Period: July 1980 - Jun 1996
Dependent Variable: D(VEXCH)
Method: Least Squares
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programme quarterly targets cannot be ignored. Therefore, the hypothesis that achieving NIR targets causes 
volatility in the exchange rate was not rejected.  
The error correction term was correctly signed and statistically significant at 1 percent level. Results indicated 
that 11.43 percent of disequilibrium of volatility series of exchange rate was corrected in the first period (Table 
4.2). The speed of adjustment of the volatility series of actual exchange rate to the equilibrium was very slow 
compared to the findings for the first period.   
The exchange rate is indisputably one of the most important macroeconomic variables. Movements in the 
exchange rate have a great bearing on key macroeconomic variables, including long-term growth rates, inflation, 
international competitiveness and the soundness of a country’s financial sector, to name only the most significant 
ones. Stability of the nominal exchange rate plays a significant role in successful performance of the economy. 
4.5.3 Impact of M0 volatility (VM0) on Interest Rate Volatility (VINT) 
Volatility series for interest rates and reserve money were generated. In this case, the interest rate volatility series 
was regressed on the reserve money volatility series and error correction term using OLS. Table 4.3 presents 
econometric results for D(VINT) for the preferred model. 
Table 4.3: Regression Results of the Preferred Model for D(VINT) by OLS  
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively; and VINT is 
interest rate volatility series 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
For the period before the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets (July 1980 to June 1996), results 
confirmed the absence of a significant relationship between volatility in interest rates and reserve money, while 
results during the period of achieving the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets confirmed its existence. 
However, government deficit was found to have a positive impact on interest rate volatility, and its coefficient 
was statistically significant at 10 percent level. Government deficit is normally financed through selling treasury 
bills and treasury bonds, which have a direct impact on interest rate. The error correction term was both correctly 
signed but statistically insignificant.  
With July 1996 to December 2009 data, a period that corresponds to achieving the IMF-supported programme 
quarterly targets in Tanzania, results from Table 4.3 confirmed causal effect of volatility in reserve money on 
interest rate volatility. Results indicate that an increase in reserve money volatility increases volatility in interest 
rates. The positive impact of reserve money volatility on interest rate volatility was proved to be statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. It was evidenced that government deficit also contributed positively to interest rate 
volatility and its coefficient was significant at 1 percent level. The coefficient of R2 indicates that about 75 
percent variation in interest rate volatility is explained by volatility in reserve money and government deficit. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that achieving IMF quarterly targets causes interest rate volatility cannot be rejected. 
The main argument is that increased volatility in money supply induced by policy caused uncertainty about the 
direction of BoT monetary policy. Such a rise in uncertainty resulted in an increased demand for money, which 
in the absence of an accommodative BoT policy, caused nominal interest rates to raise. In addition, the error 
correction term was correctly signed but statistically insignificant.  
4.5.4 Impact of M0 Volatility (VM0) on Core Rate of Inflation Volatility (VCINFL) 
Appropriate procedures were followed to generate volatility series on both inflation and reserve money. Table 
4.4 presents results of regressing inflation rate volatility series on volatility series of the reserve money and error 
correction term using the OLS method. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0158 0.0244 0.6482 0.5225 C 3.8042 1.7963 2.1178** 0.0657
D(HINFL) -0.0560 0.0509 -1.1004 0.2812 D(VM0) 0.1740 0.0505 3.4455* 0.0013
D(DF) 0.0261 0.0143 1.8246*** 0.0796 D(DF) 0.0485 0.0170 2.8467* 0.0050
ect-1 -0.0411 0.0481     -0.8543 0.3055 ect-1 -0.2210 0.1999 -1.105498 0.2431
R-squared 0.3697 R-squared 0.7527
Adjusted R-squared 0.3213 Adjusted R-squared 0.7366
Durbin-Watson stat 1.6574 Durbin-Watson stat 2.2933
Akaike info criterion -1.1573 Akaike info criterion 7.0890
Schwarz criterion -1.0159 Schwarz criterion 11.1219
First Sample Period: Jan 1994 - Jun 1996 Second Sample Period: July 1996 - Dec 2009
Dependent Variable: D(VINT)
Method: Least Squares
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Table 4.4: Econometric Results for D(VCINFL) by OLS 
 
Note: * and *** indicate significant at 1 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively; and VCINFL is the core rate 
of inflation volatility series and VM0 is reserve money volatility series. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Taking the July 1980 to June 1996 sample period, results imply that the volatility of the reserve money series 
exerted a significant impact on the volatility series of the core rate of inflation. Also evidence indicates that 
government expenditure has a positive impact on volatility of the core rate of inflation, and its coefficient is 
significant at 1 percent level. The results revealed that about 76 percent variation in the volatility of the core rate 
of inflation was explained by variation in reserve money and government expenditure. According to results of 
the error correction term, 6 percent of disequilibrium is corrected in the first period. 
On the other hand, regression results from the second sample period of July 1996 to December 2009 imply that 
the volatility of reserve money has no influence on the core rate of inflation volatility. However, government 
expenditure still has a positive impact on the core rate of inflation volatility, and its coefficient was statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. Therefore, the hypothesis that achieving the reserve money target causes the core 
rate of inflation volatility was rejected. 
The result revealed that the coefficient of the error correction terms in the model was statistically significant and 
correctly signed. This confirms that volatility series of inflation rate in Tanzania has an automatic adjustment 
mechanism and that the economy responds to deviations from equilibrium in a balancing manner. Findings 
indicated that about 45 percent of disequilibrium of the volatility series of the core rate of inflation was corrected 
in the first period, which was relatively high compared to that of the first sample period.  
Further analysis was carried out by introducing a dummy variable to capture the period before and during the 
IMF-supported programme quarterly targets in Tanzania in order to supplement results from the aforementioned 
analyses. Results are presented and discussed in the following Sub-section. 
4.5.5 Regression Estimation with a Dummy Variable 
The entire data set (July 1980 to December 2009) was analysed by incorporating a dummy variable, which was 
included in order to ascertain the impact of IMF-supported programme quarterly targets on macroeconomic 
variables. Therefore, a dummy variable was used to control for regime changes for the periods before and during 
achieving the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets.  
The regression results, which model the impact of NIR on the exchange rate as well as reserve money on interest 
rates together with the rate of inflation are presented in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. From the regression results, it is 
observed that while the dummy variable affects positively exchange and interest rates volatilities, and its 
coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, the same variable affects positively the core rate of inflation 
volatility, and its coefficient is significant at 5 percent level. This implies that achieving IMF quarterly targets 
causes macroeconomic volatility as hypothesized. Also results confirm the positive impact of volatility net 
international reserve and reserve money volatility on exchange rate as well as interest rate volatility, 
respectively. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0993 0.7954       0.1248 0.9008 3.8042 1.7963           2.1178*** 0.0657
D(VM0) 7.3841 0.6821       10.8261* 0.0000 0.0171 0.0136           1.2649 0.1464
D(GEXP) 0.0030 0.0002       19.4574* 0.0000 0.4760 0.0834           5.7045* 0.0000
ect-1 -0.0621 0.0312       -1.9929*** 0.0776 -0.4511 0.1942           -8.3233* 0.0000
R-squared 0.7654 R-squared 0.6562
Adjusted R-squared 0.7490 Adjusted R-squared 0.6456
Durbin-Watson stat 2.1449 Durbin-Watson stat 2.1334
Akaike info criterion 7.6419 Akaike info criterion 9.0584
Schwarz criterion 7.6930 Schwarz criterion 9.1156
Second Sample Period: July 1996 - Dec 2009First Sample Period: July 1980 - Jun 1996
Dependent Variable: D(VCINF)
Method: Least Squares
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Table 4.5: Impact of Dummy Variable on Exchange Rate Volatility  
 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: * indicate significant at 1 percent level, and DUMMY is a dummy variable.  
Table 4.6: Impact of Dummy Variable on Interest Rate Volatility 
 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: * indicate significant at 1 percent level and DUMMY is a dummy variable. 
Table 4.7: Impact of Dummy Variable on Inflation Rate Volatility 
 
Note: ** indicate significant at 5 percent level, and DUMMY is the dummy variable. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Results from the volatility model that incorporated a dummy variable supported results that obtained when the 
data were treated separately in two sub-periods. 
From the two separate supporting regression results, it can be concluded that achieving NIR and M0
 
targets 
caused volatility in exchange and interest rates as well as the rate of inflation. It implies that when the Bank of 
Tanzania employed a monetary policy in order to meet the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets, it 
resulted in macroeconomic volatility. Selling and buying international reserves with the intention of achieving 
the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets normally affect the nominal exchange rate. Also to achieve the 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.0073 0.0459 -0.1586 0.8741
D(VNIR) -0.0081 0.0678 -0.1195 0.9049
D(CAB) 0.0429 0.0061 7.0443* 0.0000
D(HINFL) -0.0040 0.0133 -0.3027 0.7623
DUMMY 0.2441 0.0070 34.9014* 0.0000
R-squared 0.7794
Adjusted R-squared 0.7768
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9296
Akaike info criterion 1.9417
Schwarz criterion 1.9965
Dependent Variable: D(VEXCH)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1980:02 2009:06
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0793 1.7755 0.0447 0.9644
D(VM0) 1.0584 0.1361 7.7749* 0.0000
D(DF) 0.0000 0.0000 0.4426 0.6586
D(HINFL) 0.4006 0.7002 0.5721 0.5680
DUMMY 0.2238 0.0264 8.4849* 0.0000
R-squared 0.6163
Adjusted R-squared 0.5924
Durbin-Watson stat 1.6583
Akaike info criterion 7.3741
Schwarz criterion 7.4593
Dependent Variable: D(VINT)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1994:02 2009:12
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0312 0.6539 0.0477 0.9620
D(VM0) 0.1212 0.1250 0.9691 0.3332
D(GEXP) 1.0112 2.1844 0.4629 0.4521
DUMMY 0.1633 0.0773 2.1132** 0.0316
R-squared 0.2804
Adjusted R-squared 0.2577
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0498
Akaike info criterion 7.2518
Schwarz criterion 7.2956
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1980:02 2009:06
Dependent Variable: D(VCINFL)
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reserve money targets at the end of the quarter, the Bank of Tanzania sells or buys treasury bills/bonds, which 
will affect interest rates. I addition, a reduction or an increase in reserve money, which is part of money supply in 
the economy, affect the general price level that will have an impact on the rate of inflation.  
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
5.1 Summary and conclusion 
Tanzania is among developing countries receiving both financial and non-financial assistance normally with 
conditionality from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The IMF attaches two different 
types of conditionality to its loans and other related donor assistance for poor countries, quantitative and 
structural conditionality. Quantitative conditionality refers to macroeconomic targets determining, for example, 
the level of the fiscal deficit a government is allowed to run, net domestic assets, reserve money and 
accumulation of international reserves. Structural conditionality on the other hand pushes for institutional and 
legislative policy reforms within the country. Reforms include, for example, trade reforms, price liberalization as 
well as privatization. In the course of achieving quantitative targets agreed in the IMF-supported programmes, 
the Bank of Tanzania and Ministry of Finance have to implement both monetary and fiscal policies, which may 
result in volatility of key macroeconomic variables including exchange and interest rates together with the rate of 
inflation.  
The main objective of this paper was to investigate whether or not the response of the Bank of Tanzania in 
fulfilling IMF-supported programme conditionality resulted in volatility of macroeconomic variables in 
Tanzania. More specifically, the paper sought to ascertain the extent to which achieving the reserve money target 
explained the volatility in macroeconomic variables. Also to ascertain the extent to which achieving net 
international reserves target explained the volatility in macroeconomic variables. To ascertain the extent to 
which achieving IMF-supported programme quarterly targets of net international reserves and reserve money 
amplified volatility of macroeconomic variables in Tanzania, two approaches were used in order to be confident 
with the results.  
The first approach was to regress volatility series of the exchange rate on the generated volatility series of the 
net international reserves, current account balance as well as headline rate of inflation. At the same time 
volatility series of interest rates was regressed on volatility series of reserve money, government deficit as well 
as headline rate of inflation. Also the core rate of inflation volatility series was regressed on reserve money as 
well as government expenditure. Some of variables such as current account balance, headline rate of inflation, 
government deficit as well as government expenditure were added in the models as moderating variables. 
Results from the period, which was before the IMF quarterly targets, indicated an insignificant impact of the 
volatility series of net international reserves and reserve money on the volatility series of exchange and interest 
rates. However, volatility in reserve money was observed to be positive and had significant impact on the core 
rate of inflation. Regression results for the period associated with IMF-supported programme quarterly targets 
indicated a positive and significant impact of volatility series of net international reserves and reserve money on 
volatility series of exchange and interest rates, respectively. However, core rate of inflation was found be 
unaffected by reserve money. Therefore, results indicated that achieving the IMF-supported programme 
quarterly targets amplified macroeconomic volatility in Tanzania. Therefore, hypotheses that achieving reserve 
money and net international reserve targets caused volatility in macroeconomic variables were not rejected. 
The second approach included a dummy variable in the entire data set with the dummy variable taking zero and 
one values for the periods before and during the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets, respectively. The 
dummy variable was significant for all three macroeconomic variables signifying that achieving quarterly targets 
caused macroeconomic volatility. Results from this approach supported results that were obtained when data 
were treated separately in two Sub-periods. From two separate supporting regression results it can be concluded 
that volatility in exchange and interest rates as well as in the core rate of inflation were amplified by achieving 
NIR and M0
 
targets. It implies that when the BoT employed a monetary policy aimed at meeting the IMF-
supported programme quarterly targets, it magnified macroeconomic volatility. Selling and buying foreign 
currency (international reserves) with the intention of achieving the IMF-supported programme quarterly targets 
normally affects the nominal exchange rate. Also to achieve reserve money targets at the end of quarter, the BoT 
sells or buys treasury bills/bonds, which affect interest rates. At the same time a reduction or an increase in 
reserve money, which is part of money supply in the economy affects general price level, in this manner, impact 
on the rate of inflation. From two approaches used in this paper, it was concluded that hypotheses that achieving 
reserve money and net international reserve programme targets caused volatility in macroeconomic variables 
were not rejected. 
Generally, results indicated that in the course of achieving the IMF-supported programme quantitative 
conditionality, monetary aggregates, in particular, caused volatility in macroeconomic variables in Tanzania. In 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.16, 2013 
 
130 
addition, fiscal aggregates such as government expenditure and deficit were found to amplify macroeconomic 
volatility.   
5.2 Policy implications  
Results of this paper suggest that among others, volatility of macroeconomic variables in Tanzania was 
amplified by IMF-supported programme conditionality. The implication is that the IMF-supported programme 
conditionality seems to have caused moral hazard because although IMF-supported programme targets were met 
during programme periods (at the end of the quarter), months between quarter-end experienced great diversions 
from the smooth path of the targets. One implication from this is that it is important to design appropriate or 
suitable performance criteria, which are manageable by a recipient country within a given period. This may need 
a capacity building for the recipient country’s personnel, which will enable the country to negotiate for 
affordable targets set by the IMF. 
It may also be said that it may be desirable for the Bank of Tanzania to move from a fixed to a flexible monetary 
targeting framework, which allows shocks in real and financial sectors in order to reduce volatility in the 
economy. A flexible monetary policy framework would take into account base money (reserve money) changes 
as well as developments in other macroeconomic indicators. Also recipient countries need to implement their 
economic policies on a more permanent basis in order to be able to fulfill the agreed IMF-supported programme 
conditionality without much pressure. 
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Appendices 
Figure I: Reserve Money (June 2006 to June 2007) 
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Source: Bank of Tanzania- Daily Reserve Money Statistics Report (2009) and own drawn 
 
Figure II: Net International Reserves (July 2007 to Dec 2009) 
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Source: Bank of Tanzania- Daily Reserve Money Statistics Report (2008, 2009) and own drawn 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for First Sample Period 
Sample Period: July 1980 – Jun 1996 for all variables except interest rate: Jan 1994 – Jun 1996  
  VEXCH VINT VCIN
F 
VNI
R 
VM
0 
HINF
L 
GEXP DF CAB 
 Mean 0.64 0.14 18.62 0.62 0.67 30.09 11640.83 -1481.70 -8399.00 
 Median 0.75 0.09 12.65 0.43 0.79 29.86 5907.25 -541.15 -981.50 
 
Maximu
m 
1.13 0.46 111.81 7.14 0.97 44.65 61173.00 11223.00 16344.88 
 
Minimum 
7.56E-05 7.65E-03 4.68 0.03 0.00 19.44 1221.00 13298.36 47999.00 
 Std. Dev. 0.42 0.13 15.46 1.03 0.32 5.14 12714.89 3589.35 13413.26 
 Skewness -0.36 1.32 2.12 4.56 -1.03 0.22 1.49 -0.61 -1.47 
 Kurtosis 1.53 3.34 9.91 25.98 2.52 2.35 4.52 5.26 3.92 
Observati
ons 
192 30 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Second Sample Period 
Sample Period: July 1996 – Dec 2009 
 VEXCH VINT VCINFL VNIR VM0 HINFL GEXP DF CAB 
 Mean 6.63 20.96 11.69 33.80 33.83 8.23 228846.80 -81937.86 -91340.54 
 Median 2.79 14.14 2.55 22.86 36.79 6.45 159764.50 -44331.14 -57912.09 
 Maximum 24.19 122.65 70.73 91.78 73.92 18.84 1113831.00 136971.50 247988.40 
 Minimum 0.00 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.02 3.35 11249.00 -719583.10 -636750.70 
 Std. Dev. 7.82 24.04 16.61 30.99 21.88 4.10 198786.60 109682.50 119833.90 
 Skewness 1.10 2.16 1.75 0.39 -0.11 0.98 1.37 -2.26 -1.16 
 Kurtosis 2.74 8.33 5.32 1.50 1.74 2.79 4.96 10.67 5.54 
 Observations 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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 Table 3: Cointegration Results for VEXCH, VNIR, CAB and HINFL 
Hypothesized Trace 0.05 Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.2386 91.7273 47.8561 0.0000 None * 0.1850 57.1218 47.8561 0.0053
At most 1 * 0.1441 40.7560 29.7971 0.0019 At most 1 0.0818 25.0130 29.7971 0.1610
At most 2 0.0603 11.6642 15.4947 0.1738 At most 2 0.0408 11.6182 15.4947 0.1762
At most 3 0.0002 0.0343 3.8415 0.8530 At most 3 0.0318 5.0717 7.8415 0.1243
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05 Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.2386 50.9713 27.5843 0.0000 None * 0.1850 32.1088 27.5843 0.0122
At most 1 * 0.1441 29.0918 21.1316 0.0031 At most 1 0.0818 13.3948 21.1316 0.4166
At most 2 0.0603 11.6299 14.2646 0.1253 At most 2 0.0408 6.5465 14.2646 0.5441
At most 3 0.0002 0.0343 3.8415 0.8530 At most 3 0.0318 5.0717 7.8415 0.1243
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood -2653.13 1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood -2653.13
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
VEXCH VNIR CAB HINFL VEXCH VNIR CAB HINFL
1.0000 0.2152 0.0393 0.0156 1.0000 0.2397 0.0441 1.9585
0.0393 0.0027 0.0073 0.1178 0.0300 0.7614
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Series: VEXCH VNIR CAB HINFL 
First Sample Period: July 1980 - Jun 1996 Second Sample Period: July 1996 - Dec 2009
 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
Table 4: Cointegration Results for VINT, VM0, DF and HINFL  
Hypothesized Trace 0.05 Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.8306 96.5458 47.8561 0.0000 None * 0.1745 69.1173 47.8561 0.0002
At most 1 * 0.5952 46.8346 29.7971 0.0002 At most 1 * 0.1163 39.0052 29.7971 0.0033
At most 2 0.4399 21.5113 24.3211 0.5575 At most 2 0.0775 19.5952 25.4947 0.2114
At most 3 0.1719 5.2802 9.8415 0.2160 At most 3 0.0432 6.9354 9.8415 0.1840
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05 Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.8306 49.7112 27.5843 0.0000 None * 0.1745 30.1121 27.5843 0.0232
At most 1 * 0.5952 25.3233 21.1316 0.0121 At most 1 0.1163 19.4100 21.1316 0.0856
At most 2 0.4399 11.2311 14.2646 0.2410 At most 2 0.0775 12.6597 14.2646 0.0883
At most 3 0.1719 5.2802 9.8415 0.2160 At most 3 0.0432 6.9354 8.8415 0.1084
Log likelihood -168.1467 Log likelihood -3075.004
VINT VM0 DF HINFL VINT VM0 DF HINFL
1.0000 3.7038 0.1340 0.1262 1.0000 1.5215 0.0004 1.1693
0.8344 0.0170 0.0151 0.3631 0.0001 1.3532
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
First Sample Period: Jan 1994 - Jun 1996 Second Sample Period: July 1996 - Dec 2009
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
  
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table 5: Cointegration Results for VCINFL, VM0 and GEXP 
Hypothesized Trace 0.05 Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.1430 48.6365 29.7971 0.0001 None * 0.1567 35.7529 29.7971 0.0091
At most 1 0.0941 13.7789 15.4947 0.2106 At most 1 0.0436 8.9902 15.4947 0.3663
At most 2 0.0069 1.2958 3.8415 0.2550 At most 2 0.0126 1.9859 3.8415 0.1588
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05 Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.1430 28.8576 21.1316 0.0034 None * 0.1567 26.7627 21.1316 0.0072
At most 1 0.0941 11.4831 14.2646 0.1101 At most 1 0.0436 7.0043 14.2646 0.4886
At most 2 0.0069 1.2958 3.8415 0.2550 At most 2 0.0126 1.9859 3.8415 0.1588
Log likelihood -2852.188 Log likelihood -2852.188
VCINFL VM0 GEXP VCINFL VM0 GEXP
1.0000 1144.5960 0.0292 1.0000 1.6398 0.1372
211.5260 0.0057 0.4769 0.0072
Series: VCINFL VM0 GEXP 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
First Sample Period: July 1980 - Jun 1996 Second Sample Period: July 1996 - Dec 2009
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): 1 Cointegrating Equation(s): 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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